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Scientific Expertise and Judicial Decision Making: Comparative Insights 
 
Olivier LECLERC1 
 
in Jordi Ferrer Beltrán and Susanna Pozzolo (eds.), Law, Politics and Morality: European Perspectives III. 
Ethics and Social Justice, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2007. 
 
 The interplay between law and science is increasingly illustrated by many debates, 
ranging from biological filiations to global warming. It is barely necessary to emphasize the 
extent to which this very interplay stands at the core of the legal answer to genetics. This 
paper focuses on some aspects of the relationship science and law foster. 
The relationship between science and law has been studied through two main 
analytical frameworks. 
(1) According to the main approach, law and science are to be thought of as forming 
two separate spheres, each of them ruled according to its own principles and producing 
specific outcomes. Generally speaking, science is supposed to provide a true account of the 
world, whereas legal rules are deemed to regulate human behaviour. Hence, legal systems 
would incorporate many goals other than merely truth seeking, such as solving social disputes 
in a convenient amount of time. This conception emphasizes the ‘culture clash’2 that 
characterizes the relationship between science and law. 
Accordingly, the relationship between science and law may be conceived in a twofold 
perspective. One of them is to advocate the continuous adaptation of law to science. What we 
recognize here is a notion very familiar to jurists, according to whom law will comply with its 
own requirements only if it remains in a close adequacy with the object it is supposed to 
regulate. Here also lie the roots of the idea of progress and its relationship with the legal 
system. Science is seen as an ongoing progressive process. Therefore, if the legal system 
remains closely connected to it, it will increase the rationality of its own operations. 
Conversely, the interplay between science and law might be conceived in a much less 
harmonious way. The autonomous development of science has often been regarded as 
threatening society. It has been advocated that science would force its own development on 
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society, thus preventing people from developing their own project in life. Hence, the legal 
system is here expected to provide an efficient protection against a hegemonic scientific 
development. The progress-laden conception is here strongly criticized: the democratically 
debated legal provisions would reflect a social consensus on how far we want to follow 
scientific progress. There will be, some say, ‘a right to assess scientific progress’.3 
 (2) I hold that none of these approaches is likely to give an accurate account of the 
interplay between science and law. Indeed, they both take the divide between law and science 
for granted. It is my contention that this very border is forged in the interplay itself. When the 
judge or the legislator is required to pronounce on a scientific issue, he decides, in a more or 
less explicit way, the criteria scientific knowledge must fulfil to be granted scientific standing 
in a legal setting. In that sense, ‘the institutional setting of the law shapes the representation of 
legally relevant scientific claims at many points, beginning with the articulation of standards 
for what counts as valid science with the legal process. In other words, ideas of truth and ideas 
of justice are co-constructed in the context of legal proceedings’.4 
As a result, the interplay between law and science is poorly described as a mere 
adjustment of law to science. Rather, a legal conception of science emerges from it. 
 
This interplay occurs on many occasions. I will focus my attention on the trial, and 
more precisely on the scientific testimony experts provide to courts. Expertise might be 
defined as the process in which scientific knowledge is provided to someone in order to help 
decision making. Hence, expertise is at the core of any decision where scientific knowledge is 
to be taken into account. 
It derives from this definition that the framework in which the decision-making 
process is taking place, and particularly the proceedings it follows, will be of decisive 
influence on expertise. Scientific expertise in court must then be understood in its relationship 
to the judicial decision-making process. 
It is now that the question arises of how the judge would ensure that the scientific 
knowledge carried by an expert is not corrupted by ignorance or raw fraud. The term that has 
been coined to designate this insufficient knowledge is ‘junk science’. As the law attributes 
the label of ‘junk science’, it might be said that the legal system is providing a criterion of 
science within the limits of legal framework. 
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In that sense, the selection of scientific experts enables the legal system to face the 
epistemological ‘problem of demarcation’ raised by Sir Karl Popper.5 Popper aims at 
discriminating between what counts as science and what does not. He would then allow 
science to be immune from any social or metaphysical roots and would concentrate only on 
the structure of scientific utterances. 
This legal conformation of science is not universal, as reveals a comparison with the 
legal system of the United States. Both the French and the American systems are facing the 
problem of demarcation in forging a legal construction of science. A properly legal 
epistemology is to be seen in legal rules on expertise. Indeed, determining which expert is 
allowed to testify in court leads to determining what will count as science in the eyes of the 
legal system. Selecting scientific experts induces a choice on what might be ranked ‘good 
science’ and what must be termed ‘junk science’. Thus, a plurality of legal constructions of 
‘good science’ has to be described. 
In French law, the scientific validity of an expert’s testimony is certified before the 
trial (I), whilst in the United States legal system judges act as gatekeepers for valid science 
(II). 
 
I- A ‘scientific legality’: a legal construction of science before a trial 
 
 French law’s provisions on scientific expertise involve a legal construction of science. 
In this case, the selection of scientific experts is largely done before any trial takes place. 
Within the French legal system, the judge is entitled to commit an expert: the expert does not 
belong to the court but he is appointed by the court. The legal provision through which this 
selection of experts prior to a trial is done leads to the certification of what counts as ‘good 
science’. The legal mechanisms contributing to this legal representation of valid science might 
be termed ‘scientific legality’. This scientific legality enables the French legal system to 
address the problem of demarcation between ‘good science’ and ‘junk science’. 
 
1- The official lists of court-appointed experts 
The selection of scientific experts is mainly done through a list of experts. When they 
require appointing a scientific expert, the judges suffice with choosing one of them from this 
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list. The appointment of these experts is not compulsory for the judges, who might very well 
choose an expert outside the lists. Nevertheless, these lists prove to be very effective. 
Although one could hardly claim to have an exhaustive view of the practice of the courts, 
statistics show that judges usually pick experts from these lists.6 Furthermore, in criminal 
cases the judge can avoid picking the expert from the list only on exceptional grounds and 
with a special motivation.7 In civil cases, although the practice might be very different in each 
court, judges usually appoint experts from the lists. 
As a result, the legal provisions on the constitution of the lists contribute to the 
selection of scientifically relevant experts. Thus, in order to be registered on the list, the 
scientific experts must show a certified knowledge. 
 
a- Expert’s registration on a court-appointed experts list 
Legal provisions determine the qualities an expert must possess in order to appear on a 
court-appointed experts list. Historically, the expert’s skill was mainly revealed by the 
diplomas he was required to hold, but the courts were entitled to select them along with their 
own preferences and criteria. 
More recently, however, various commissions have been created in order to verify the 
expert’s competence and, at the same time, proceed to their registration on the list. For 
example, experts in charge of the identification of people through DNA typing must have 
been approved by a special commission.8 The candidates must prove to have completed a 
specific diploma or to have a long-lasting experience of that practice. Furthermore, those who 
apply for registration must demonstrate that they dispose of certain specific materials and 
property. Equally, a recent statute on the rights of sick persons and on the quality of health 
care has created a specific list of experts who must be approved by a national commission on 
medical accidents.9 This Commission is charged to ascertain the scientific knowledge of the 
experts and then to register them on the list, without allowing any appeal. 
Not only does the certification of the experts’ knowledge take place before their 
registration on the list, but, in some specific cases, their competence is also ascertained on a 
periodical basis. Regarding the experts on the identification of people through DNA typing, a 
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governmental agency10 is charged, among others, to organize application exercises which the 
registered experts must pass twice a year. The results determine whether or not the experts 
will remain registered in the following year.11 
 Thus, these lists lead to a standardization of the knowledge experts must possess. The 
registration will then endow their holders with a specific legitimacy. The standardization 
effect is reinforced by the classification of scientific fields it induces. 
 
b- The nomenclature of scientific fields 
The lists are divided into many specialities ranging from medicine, genetic typing, and 
handwriting identification to fires and explosions. This classification leads to a certification of 
valid scientific knowledge. It fulfils a performative function. The fields mentioned on the lists 
are deemed sufficiently reliable to be presented to a judge. 
The nomenclature of scientific and technical fields used to be left to each court of 
appeal and to the Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) for civil and criminal matters. This led 
to a certain diversity among the courts, although some statutes created specific expert 
categories to be filled in each court.12 In order to keep this diversity within certain limits, a 
unified nomenclature was issued in July 2002 by the Ministry of Justice in line with the 
expressed wishes of professional organizations.13 This new nomenclature is currently 
diffusing throughout the courts and is due to be taken into account shortly. 
 
2- The professionalization of experts 
Most of the registered experts are members of professional organizations. These 
organizations contribute, on the one hand, to the organization of the profession (discipline, 
deontology, etc.), and, on the other hand, to the standardization of the scientific knowledge of 
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the members. Many of these organizations enact quality guidelines including standardized 
methods and minimal knowledge to implement. As a result, the certification of scientific 
knowledge follows, not only from the procedures used for the establishment of the lists, but 
also from the professional standards. 
 Hence, as long as a scientific expert is registered on a list and shows the competence 
required by the legal provisions, he is presumed to be dependable enough to have a say in the 
trial. Consequently, during the trial, the competence of the expert is hardly discussed, for he is 
already deemed scientifically competent. Therefore, the expert might only be challenged for 
the same reasons that the judge would be: he might be challenged for being biased or for 
entertaining a special relationship with one of the parties. A recent sentence of the Cour de 
cassation, issued pursuant to Article 6-1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, holds 
that the list of recusation causes14 is not limitative and that an expert might be challenged if 
his behaviour had deprived the parties of due process of law.15 This sentence does not 
substantially change the legal picture, for the recusation of an expert remains closely related 
to the judgement and not to scientific competence. 
The scientific legality in the French system hardly leads to a debate on what should 
count as valid science or what should not. The American system faces the demarcation 
problem differently. 
 
II- A ‘jurisdictional epistemology’: the judges as gatekeepers against ‘junk science’ 
 
 In the US legal system, parties may recruit as many experts as they can afford. 
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rule 26 (b), 4, A) : ‘A party may depose 
any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial’. 
The number of designated experts might be of strong influence in the trial, all the more so if 
they prove to be famous in their field. This ‘commodification of the expert’16 might increase 
dramatically the price of expert witnessing. 
 The experts are supposed to be neutral toward the case at trial but it is fairly obvious 
that they would be chosen according to the opinion they will raise in the case at stake. This is 
termed an advocacy system. Each expert-witnessing is discussed not only by the parties on 
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trial but, more generally, also by every interested person or group. Those who wish to 
participate in the debate might issue an amicus brief exposing the scientific elements they 
deem appropriate to solve the case at hand. Furthermore, the judge may hear as many amici 
curiae as he would find necessary. For example, when the Supreme Court settled a case on 
euthanasia, the judges heard no less than eighty interested persons and groups. The judge is 
then providing an explicit balance between the various interests and theories at stake.17 
 
1- The judge’s gatekeeper function 
Unlike in the French legal system, the scientific expert in the US legal system is not 
selected prior to the trial and his knowledge is not certified beforehand. Consequently, the 
judge will have to evaluate how reliable the expertise can be. To put it bluntly, the judge may 
face a situation in which he has to decide whom to trust more: a parapsychologist or a particle 
physicist.18 
As a result, the debate on what is considered as reliable scientific knowledge is made 
visible and is subjected to cross-examination. The American system is then internalizing the 
process from which the scientific legitimacy of an expert derives. The control of the access of 
scientific knowledge to the courts is completed by the judge. The judge then has to fulfil a 
gatekeeper function. Whereas the French system displays a ‘scientific legality’, the American 
system rests upon a ‘jurisdictional epistemology’. 
 
2- The jurisdictional criteria for good science 
As the judge is in charge of rejecting ‘junk science’, the courts had to design a 
criterion to identify what should count as ‘good science’. The criterion in use has long been 
the commercial marketplace test. It was assumed that as long as an expert could make a living 
within his profession, he could be reasonably held more competent than the average juror. 
Nonetheless, this criterion led to unsatisfactory results, for it provided no guarantee of quality, 
especially in medical cases: a charlatan could very well make a living off the credulity of 
people. Hence, the question was debated of how the reliability of a proffered scientific 
expertise could be ascertained. 
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This question was raised in the Frye v. United States case heard by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia in 1923.19 Mr Frye was convicted of murder. 
He claimed to prove his innocence by using a lie detector test, a technique usually labelled a 
‘polygraph test’. The Court had to decide whether this proof was reliable enough to be 
presented to the jury. The Court rejected this expertise on the grounds of a ‘general 
acceptance test’: according to the Court, ‘the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs’. Hence, the criterion rests on the acceptance of the technique or the theory in the 
scientific community. The judge must then measure how broadly it is accepted. 
The general acceptance test has been largely diffused through the courts but some 
courts adopted a more deferential attitude toward science: any person claiming to be an expert 
might be heard in trial, except if the probative value of this expertise ‘is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury’. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence, which came into force in 1975, adopts this provision in Rule 
403. However, it remained unclear whether the general acceptance test would have survived 
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The doors of the courts remained largely 
open: any person claiming to be ‘an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education’ may testify to the court (Rule 702). The spectre of ‘junk science’ had begun to 
haunt the courts. 
 
3- The spectre of ‘junk science’ 
Many criticisms were proffered against the liberality of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.20 The demise of the general acceptance test confronted the jury with scientific 
expertise whose quality was far from reliable, even fraudulent. 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,21 the United States Supreme Court was 
given an occasion to rule on the admissibility of expertise in court. Bendectin was a drug 
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commonly used by pregnant women against morning sickness. Following the birth of a child 
suffering limb defects, the parents sued the firm producing Bendectin, Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals. The plaintiffs claimed to prove the existence of a causal link between the 
ingestion of Bendectin and their child’s suffering. One of their expert witnesses showed a 
‘meta-analysis’ of already existing epidemiological studies. These studies, however, showed 
no causal link between Bendectin ingestion and birth defects. Nonetheless, the expert claimed 
to be able to establish a link with a broader method of analysis. 
The Supreme Court first invested the judges with the function of determining what 
should be held as good science: ‘under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable’. According to the 
Supreme Court, ‘this entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or 
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal 
judges possess the capacity to undertake this review’. 
Then, the Supreme Court sets four criteria meant to help the judges in their newly 
attributed monitoring task: 
 
1. ‘Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique 
is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has 
been) tested’. 
2. ‘Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication’. 
3. ‘Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should 
consider the known or potential rate of error’. 
4. ‘Finally, “general acceptance” can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A “reliability 
assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant 
scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance 
within that community.” … Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling 
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particular evidence admissible, and “a known technique that has been able to attract only 
minimal support within the community”’. 
 
The Daubert criteria reveal the epistemic syncretism of the Supreme Court. On the one 
hand, it refers to a now standard epistemology: quoting Popper22 and Hempel,23 it refers to 
falsification (tests) and to potential rates of errors of scientific theories. On the other hand, the 
Court mentions social aspects of scientific community: peer review, general acceptance. In 
this sense, the Supreme Court tries to conciliate classical epistemology with more recent 
developments in social studies of science: ‘The late Karl Popper’s largely discredited notion 
of science as progressing through clear falsification of erroneous claims appeared side-by-side 
with the view of constructivist sociologists of science that knowledge accumulates through 
negotiation and consensus among members of scientific community’.24 
The Daubert case has been applied ever since and it has even been extended. In 
General Electric Company v. Robert K. Joiner,25 the Supreme Court urges the judges not only 
to screen the conclusions of the expert but also to screen the reasoning he has been using. In 
Kumho Tire Company v. Patrick Carmichael,26 concerning an engineer in tyres, the Supreme 
Court holds that the Daubert rule must also be applied to non-scientific expertise. 
 
Conclusion 
Whereas the French legal system addresses the problem of demarcation through 
statutes and through the activity of various committees, the US legal system places it at the 
heart of the trial. As a result, a federal judge well may have decided that the technique of 
fingerprint identification, though broadly in use in forensic science, does not meet the 
Daubert requirements of scientificity.27 In that decision, after a strict scrutiny of the 
fingerprint technique, the judge held that ‘fingerprint identification techniques have not been 
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tested in a manner that could be properly characterized as scientific’. He adds that the 
technique hasn’t properly been submitted to publication and peer review, for those who use 
this technique hardly form a ‘scientific community’ in the Daubert sense. Furthermore, no 
rate of error is even known for this technique. 
In this sense, the scientificity of a proffered scientific expertise is made visible and is 
subjected to the hard look of the judges. But the question was raised of how far judges can be 
able to fulfil the gatekeeper function they are endowed with. In the United States, some plead 
for the development of special scientific training for judges. A reference manual is 
periodically issued in order to review the latest scientific consensus in each field.28 
In the most recent years, more attention has been paid to the faculty offered to the 
judge to appoint a scientific expert. In order to ease the judge’s task, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science is leading a five-year research program in order 
to assess how a list of certified experts could be helpful for judges.29 Concerning particularly 
debated subjects, it could be possible to appoint a scientific panel of experts representing 
diverse opinions regarding the scientific aspects of the case at stake.30 
These suggestions reveal, to a certain extent, a parallel between French law and 
American law. Both systems aim at facing the demarcation problem. It cannot come as a 
surprise that they sometimes converge to some extent. This shows that describing the 
interplay between science and law as an adjustment of law to science would overlook the 
variety of legal constructions of science produced by legal systems. 
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